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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
VERN FRAILEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

JOHN C.

:;~GARRY,

l
~

Case No. 2506

Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELiniiNARY STATE1iENT
The statement of the case as set forth in appellant's
brief sets forth some of the material provisions of the
contract sought to be rescinded by appellant, and discusses briefly the pleadings, findings, conclusions, decision of the court and judgment.. Plaintiff's assignments
of error do not attack any of the findings, and consequently none of the eYidence is set forth or discussed in
the appellant's brief.

The respondent by cross-assign-

ment of error 'vill attnek Conclusion of Ija'v No. 1 that
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the contract between appellant and respondent was subject to rescission because of misrepresentation by the re:
spondent as to the availability of water for irrigation of
the lands, and in discussing this cross-assignment of
error will later in this brief discuss the evidence applicable thereto.
However, respondent believes it will be more orderly
and convenient, both to court and counsel, to first answer
the contentions of the appellant as they appear in appellant's brief, and then set forth the respondent's crossassignments oi error and discuss the same. If this Honorable Court should agree with the trial court's conclusions of law to the effect that the contract in question is
not' now subject to rescission and that the plaintiff is not
entitled to any relief under his amended complaint, then
it is not necessary to consider or determine or rule upon
the respondent's cross-assignments of error.
A.RGUMENT

The trial court sustained the respondent's motion to
strike that portion of paragraph 8 of the amended complaint commencing with the word "and" on line eight
and continuing through to and including the word
"monopoly" at the end of subdivision (1) of said paragraph. The motion is at page 27 of the judgment roll,
paragraph 1 thereof. At the commencement of the trial
the court reinstated such portion of paragraph 9 (Tr. 2).
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\Vhether or not the court erred in striking such portion
of the complaint, or erred thereafter in _reinstating the
same, is of no importance "~hatever, because there is no
proof to sustain such allegations and there are no findings of fact pursuant to such allegations. The portion
of the complaint in question alleges tliat on a number of
occasions prior to the execution of the contract the defendant attempted to file applications to appropriate water
in the office of the state engineer to irrigate the lands in
question; that his applications had been denied by the
state engineer because there was not sufficient 'vater
available to irrigate the lands and because permitting
the defendant to make such applications would be against
public policy and for the purpose of securing· to the defendant a monopoly. The only possible purpose of such
alleg·ations would be to show that the defendant had
knowledge that the applications of plaintiff would not
be allowed. The only evidence in the entire record concerning the rejection of any applications to appropriate
water in the Beryl underground district is found at page
120 and 123 of the reporter's transcript. 1\fr. Ward, deputy state engineer, was testifying on direct and followi ng is the extent of such testimony :

Q. Do you haYe in mind any particular filing made
there that 'vas rejected~
A. No, not in recent years. I have never rejected
anv in that area that I recall, but prior to my
ti~e there 'vere some filings I think were filed
in the namr of !Carla Louise J\!IcGarry that
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Q.

were rejected.
Do you know . what relation she bears to Mr.
McGarry~

A.
Q.

No~

definitely. I have always assumed - Do you know the husband's name of this Mrs.
l\icGarry~

A.

I have understood that he was Ambrose McGarry.
MR. HANSEN : I don't suppose you deny he is a
brother of John C. McGarry'! If material~
MR. CLINE: If there is any materiality in it, I
wouldn't deny it, no.
MR. HANSEN: I don't know that _there is any materiality in it. (Tr. 120-12-1).
Q. I don't quite gather.J Mr. Ward, whether you
.stated that in recent years at least"" so far as
you know, there have been no applications that
have been filed for water in the Beryl area that
have been rejected by your office. ·
A. I don't recall of any.
Q. And the one application to which you .refer
was made how many years ago approximately~
A. I don't know the filing date .. When I arrived
in the State Engineer's office in -1941 I was
given the responsibility of answering some of
the letters pertaining to these files after the
application had been rejected.
Q. So that there have been no rejections of any
water applications at least between 1941 and up
to the time when these applications of Mr.
Frailey and 1\tfr. Thompson 'vere filed in December, 1945 f
A. I don't recall any that have been rejected.
(Trans. 123).
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The record not only shows affirmatively that no
"\Vater application~ or filings "\Yere rejected after a single
rejection in 1941, but fails to sho'v '"·hy that application
"'"as rejected. There is a complete absence of proof that
any application mnde by defendant 'vas rejected and
there is a complete absence of proof that the state engineer ever reje(!ted an application for the reason that to
appro\'"e it would create a monopoly or would be against
public policy.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS
XOT AGAINS·T PUBLIC POLICY
Respondent confesses an- utter and complete inability to follow appellant's reasoning "\vhen he argues that
the contract is against public policy.
It seems that the appellant contends that the contract
is against public policy because the defendant was making
an unconscionable profit out of public waters and created
a monopoly of public waters in favor of the respondent.
At the outset it may 'vell be observed, and appellant
seems to overlook, that it was he who made the applications for water and not the respondent. Respondent
claims the water through and under the appellant by reason of the contract. The appellant could contract with
reference to water applications he was to make before or
after executing the agreement; and could, for that matter, contract to sell, rent or otherwise deal 'vith the same.
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If the water applications were not tainted with speculation or monopoly when appellant made the applications,
ho"\\r could they become tainted thereafter because of
appellant's disposition of them' Appellant argues that
the applications for water made by him were not tainted
with monopoly and speculation when he made them but
thereafter would become tainted if the ;respondent ultimately acquired them. He contends that he can enter
into a contract to purchase land, thereafter make applications to appropriate "rater for irrigation thereof, and
this his own applications create a monopoly in favor of
respondent and for that reason give rise to a right to
rescind-and this when respondent gets the water only
in the event of a default by appellant.
However, even though respondent made the applications, which is not the fact, he contends there "\\rould be no
element of monopoly or spec"ulation and the contract
would not be void as against public policy.
It is elementary that the rules which hold a contract
void as against public policy should not be unduly extended; that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in
their freedom to make their own contracts and that courts
should act cautiously and not hold contracts void as being
contrary to public policy unless they are clearly and unmistakably so. Certainly there is no presumption that
a contract is against public policy unless it so appears
from the face and provisions of the contract.
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Section 100-3-8 rr. C .•4.. 1943, provides:
''It shall be the duty of the state engineer, upon
the payment of the approval fee to approve an application if * * * 4. The applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works and the
application "~as filed in good faith and not for the
purpose of speculation or monopoly.''
By this legislative enactment the state engineer is required to approve an application if, among· other things,
the application 'v-as filed in g·ood faith and not for the purpose of speculation or monopoly. The statute does not
define what is speculation or what is monopoly. We assume the terms are used in their ordinary sense. In the
first place, the state engineer has not refused to ,approve
any of the applications in question for any such ·reasons.
Secondly, is the application for sufficient water to irrigate a section of land, and the granting of sufficient well
rights for that purpose the creation of a monopoly~
Thirly, does the statute conte:rp.plate that _procuring and
using water for the irrigation of arid land, and the resultant enhancement of values because of the water is
such a monopoly and speculation and prohibited~ Fourthly, is the application by plaintiff for well rights to irrigate land which he is purchasing, the creation of a monopoly and a speculation~ And may this court determine
such matter in a collateral proceeding or is the right to
deter1nine whether an application creates a monopoly or
is made for speculation left to the determination of the
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~tate

engineer?

Respondent insists that there is no evidence of
monopoly or speculation in the record because he did not
make the water applications and even had he done so,
there is still no such evidence of monopoly or speculation
as is contemplated by the statute.
The appellant further argues that the contract is
against public policy and void because respondent was
making an unconscionable profit out of public waters.
Without doubt the evidence shows and the trial court
found that the land without water was worth $1~50 per
acre, and when water is available for irrigation the land
was worth $30.00 per acre. Such evidence was admitted
over the objection of the plaintiff (Tr. 121-123), the objection being that such evidence was immaterial and irrelevant and not -within the issues. 'V e are not assigning
error respecting· such ruling because even though the evidence stands it can have no bearing on the legal problems presented by this appeal.
There is nothing whatsoever in the record to sho\Y
\Vhat price defendant paid for the land. Plaintiff admits
that the price paid by defendant is not made to appear.
Defendant was on the stand in the trial of this cause and
no attempt was made by appellant to elicit this information. The record shows 1880 acres of land of 'vhich the
land described in the contract wae a part, was sold by
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an estate to defendant's predecessor in interest for $1.50
per acre.

The record does not show how much addi-

tional defendant's predecessor in interest may have paid
out in expenses in checking record, checking on the land,
negotiating· the purchase, etc. The record does not show
what profit he made when he sold to defendant. The record does not show whether the 960 acres sold to plaintiff
was the cream of the land and what value could be placed
on the remaining land. The record does not show what
profit defendant made fr~m_ the sale of the land, even
assuming the matter of profit is material. All the record does show is that 1880 acres of which the land in
question is a part is worth $1.50 without 'vater and $30.00
with water-all of which was known to the plaintiff when
he entered into the contract. Plaintiff. made no attempt
to show what prices are being asked by owners of other
and similar adjoining· premises for the same type of land,
"'"ithout \Vater. He is attempting to move the well rights
for the irrigation of other land which he has purchased,
but fails to state what he actually paid for this other land.
We have never understood that a large profit entitled a vendee under a contract to rescind. But appellant argues that the large profit came from the public
\raters. ....\_s pointed out previously, the appellant as a
\Tendee made the water applications and not the respondent. Any profit made was from the sale of the land.and
not from the public w..aters, 'vhich respondent now claim~
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by virtue of a contract. In effect the right to the \Vater
in the event of a forfeiture of the contract was in the nature of so much additional security for the faithful per-formance of the contract. However, respondent submits
that even though he himself had applied for the water
and sold the land and water for $30.00 per acre, still
there is nothing objectionable and appellant could not
rescind. Respecting profit, it is further pointed out that
without evidence of the cost of the sale, and expenses in
connection with his procuring the land and the price
which he paid, this court cannot even find there was any
profit, much less an unconscionable profit.

We cannot follow the appellant's reasoning in insisting that by the contract the defendant seeks to change the
laws of the state because the contract provides that water ..... .
represented by applications shall be: considered appurtenant to the land. It is true, of course, this Court has held
that water represented by an application to appropriate,
(until the well has been drilled), is not appurtenant to
the premises. But this court has never held that parties
may not by contract make such water rights appp.rtenant.
This court has held that certain permanent improvements
made on realty become appurtenant, and that certain improvements not of a permanent character do not become
appurtenant. But this court has never held that the parties may not by contract, as between themselves, agree
that certain improvements shall or shall not become ap-
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'

purtenant.
'': e also point out that it is immaterial whether the
"\Vater under the contract becomes appurtenant to the land.
The contract provides as follows :
"It is agreed that in the event the buyer or any
assignee shall make application to appropriate
" . . ater or shall procure a certificate of appropriation
to appropriate· water or shall procure a certificate
to appropriate water from wells located upon the
said premises and said buyer or assignee or assignees shall thereafter default in this contract, the
seller shall immediately become the assignee of any
such application or appropriation and the State
Engineer of the State of Utah is hereby authorized
to recognize said seller as the assignee of any such
application and in the event a certificate of appropriation has issued to the said buyer, the water rights
thereunder shall be considered as appurtenant to
the said premises and in the event of default, the
title thereto shall immediately pass to the seller."
The agreement is that the seller, in the event -of a
default, shall become the assignee of any water application and the water rights shall be considered as a ppurtenant "and in the event of a default, the title thereto shall
immediately pass to the seller." In order for the respondent, after default, to become entitled to the water appliration it is not necessary for the water to be considered
as appurtenant, although we do not recede from our position that it does become so under the contract. Title
can pass under and by virtue of the contractual provision
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that the seller on default became the assignee; and can
pass under and by virtue of the provision that title
thereto shall pass immediately to the seller-and we add,
regardless whether the water application is or is not appurtenant. And the trial court could award the \Vater
application to the seller by virtue of the contractual provision that ''in the event of default, the title thereto shall
immediately pass to the seller'' as well as by virtue of
the provision that ''the seller shall immediately become
the assignee of any such application or appropriation,"
and as well as by virtue of the provision that ''the water
rights thereunder shall be considered as appurtenant to
the said premises.''
Moreover, if the defendant lived up to his contractual obligations, the title to the land and the \Vater
rights would eventually pass to him and he would become
the sole owner thereof. Certainly there is nothing against
public policy in such an agreement. But, argues the plaintiff, i~ he fails to perform under the contract and by the
violation of his own contractual obligations permits the
title to the water to pass to the defendant, then the contract is against public policy. Plaintiff further argues
that nevertheless he should end up with title to the \Vater.
This is indeed a weird legal theory.
Complaint is made by appellant that the court awarded the defendant the applications to appropriate water
filed by Jerold E. Thompson, w·ho is not a party to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
action.
Plaintiff commenced the suit asking· for a rescission
of the contract and that it be declared null and void, and
that plaintiff be a-w,arded $2600.00 credited as a down payment. The cros-s-complaint filed by defendant prayed
that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint and that the
contract be declared to have been breached by plaintiff
and to be in default and declared cancelled and forfeited.
The judgment decrees that the contract is not subject to any rescission by the plaintiff and that he take
nothing by reason of his amended complaint; and further
decrees that plaintiff has defaulted in and breached the
contract and declared the same to be forfeited and terminated. The pleadings and issues involved do not necessitate that the court decree the water filings made in the
name of Thompson did not belong to the plaintiff but belonged to Thompson. As a matter of fact the water applications or filings do not belong to Thompson and were
not intended to be the property of Thompson.
Thompson testified -that in the discussion between
Frailey and McGarry h_e was to work into the deal and

have an interest in the land; that there was some doubt
as to ho\V the state engineer might feel

abo~t

one man

applying for nine wells and inasmuch as Frailey wanted
Thompson to get started there they decided ''to put five
"'rlls in my name, four pretty good sized wells and one
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smaller well." ( Tr. 74-7 5). He testified also that since
he did not have any money to put up Frailey assumed the
financial obligation of the deal 'vith the understanding or
verbal agreement that he would work along on a salary
and a bonus and a portion of the bonus would apply on
what Frailey wanted to give him; that when he paid back
enough money he was to be given 250 acres of ground,
including the water, and therefore he signed the \Vater
applications. ( Tr. 75).
Frailey testified that he made about half of the applications to his brother-in-law Thompson, who was there
during the negotiations and who 'vitnessed the contract;
that he told Thompson that as they developed the ground
he would sell Thompson a piece of the· land ''and allow
him one or two wells.'' That at the time the contract
was signed Thompson was 'vorking for Frailey (Tr.
12-13). Frailey also testified that in the event Thompson
did not purchase any of the ground he (Frailey) presumed the wells would be his. (Tr. 40); that Thompson
was present during much of the discussions bet,veen
Frailey and McG~rry and \vitnessed the contract (Tr. 40).
It is alleged in paragraph 1 of the affirmatiYe defense set forth in the ans,ver (R. 33) that Thompson \vas
well aware of the terms of the agreement and was interested in the purchase of the premises and was to receiYr
a title to a portion thereof, and by the reply and ans\Yer
of plaintiff thereto (R. 38-39) it is admitted there \Yn~
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an oral understanding that if sufficient water to irrigate
the lan4 'vas secured, and if and when plaintff acquired
title to said lands, plaintiff would sell some of the lands
to Thompson but that Thompson no longer claims any
interest in the contract.
There can be no question but that the water filings
made in Thompson's name 'vere for the benefit of plaintiff and that plaintiff was the real party in interest and
the equitable owner thereof; that Thompson knew of
the provisions of the contract making the defendant assignee of water filings made to irrigate the lands in case
of default. At the trial of this case Thompson did not
contend he was the owner of the water filings and under
all the facts and circumstances cannot now successfully
so contend. Not being a party to the suit the court was
under no duty to declare such holding·s belonged to Thompson or to declare otherwise. The court made its finding
No. 7 (R. 72) that about half of the applications were put
... in Thompson's name because he was going to purchase
some of the premises ; that Thompson was to purchase
250 acres of land and have water to irrigate such land;
that he was a witness to the contract and was well aware
of the terms of the agreement and was interested in the
agreement.
Since Frailey put some of the applications in Thompson's name, (particularly with Thompson's full knowledge of the provisions of the contract pertaining to water
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being made appurtenant to the land) the court properly
could require Frailey to procure Thompson's assignment
of those water filings as a condition to decreeing a rescission of the contract. It would seem strange that Frailey
could make applications in Thompson's name, and not be
required to get Thompson's assignments as a condition
precedent to a rescission of the contract.

THE TRIAI.J COURT DID NOT ERR IN STRIKING
THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
By plaintiff's second cause of action he claims the
right to rescind the contract because it is alleged the plaintiff requested the defendant to furnish an abstract or
polic-y of title insurance and defendant failed so to do.
There is no allegation that the. plaintiff tendered the balance due under the terms of the contract. The court sustained a demurrer to that cause of action.
T~e

contract provides :

"The seller, on receiving the pay1ne11fs hrrein
reserved to be paid at the times and in thr man11l'r
above 1nentioned agrees to execute and deliver to
the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty
deed conveying the title to the above described
· :prentises free and clear of all encumbrances, except as herein mentioned and except as may haYc
accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the
buyer, and to furnish at his expense an abstract or
apolicy of title insurance at the option of the seller
brought to date at the time of sale or at time of de·
livery of deed at the option of the bnyer."
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' T e agTee

that the se Her binds himself to do two
things on receiYing· the payments-to execute and deliver
a deed conYeying· a good title to the buyer, and to furnish
either an abstract of title or policy of title insurance
brought to date at fi1ne of sale or at,thnc of delivery of·
the deed at the option of the buyer. But he is only obligated to do those t\vo things on receiving_ the payments
agreed upon and not before. The buyer cannot demand
that the seller do those things until full and complete
payment has been made. The phrase ''at the option of
the buyer'' clearly refers to the fact of whether the abstract or policy of title insurance shall show as of time
of sale or time when the deed is delivered, and under ordinary circumstances the buyer would exercise the option
to have the abstract brought to date of delivery of the
deed.
The authorities cited by appellant to support his
contention (page 26 of appellant's brief) are not applicable. In the case of Kneeland vs. Hetzel, 103 Okl. 3, 229
Pac. 218, one of the cases cited by appellant, the question
before the· court was whether the abstract furnished
showed a marketable title. In the case at bar the court
made an express finding that plaintiff's allegation that
defendant did not have good title to the lands involved
at the time the contract was entered into is untrue. (Finding No. 29,

R·~

76).

In the case of Naylor vs. Jolley, 111 Pac. (2nd)
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100 Utah 130, this court held that "under land contract
calling for deferred payments and delivery of deed at
time of final payment, marketable title in vendor at time
he is required to deliver deed is sufficient.'' The trial
court held as a matter of law that under the express provisions of the contract the· defendant was not required to
tender an abstract or policy of title insurance until pay- ments due under the contract were made or at least tendered, and held also that the failure of defendant's wife
to execute the contract was no grounds for rescission.
Clearly such holding is correct.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN STRIKING
THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
It is contended by appellant in its fourth cause of
action that the contract is so uncertain and vague it cannot be enforced. The trial court sustained a demurrer
to this cause of action.
We admit freely that the language of the contract
pertaining to payments is awk,vard, quite usual where
the average layman attempts to formulate a legal document, and there is room for improvement by way of
clearer_ expressions. However, when viewed in the light
of the circumstances, the provisio~s in the contract concerning payments are capable of- being construed harmoniously and reasonably.
It is true that the contract does not expressly obli-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
gate the plaintiff to apply for any ",.nter to irrigate the
lands. Only the defendant, not the plaintiff, could be injured because the contract did not expressly require the
plaintiff to apply for "'"ater. It 'vill be remembered, howeYer, that either at the time the contract was executed
or immediately thereafter the plaintiff did apply for
\\'"ater and all of the neg-otiations and discussions leadingup to the execution of the contract contemplated that he
should do so. \\Te fail to see why the plaintiff should be
concerned about the rights of the parties if he failed to
apply for water, since he did actually apply for water to
be taken from a number of wells.
Vie,ved in the light of the circumstances and negotiations leading up to the execution of the contract the
meaning of the provisions concerning payment is reasonably clear. Each well application was for a definite
amount and to irrigate a definite acreage. (Ex. 10 - and
Trans. 158 to 161). Therefore when permission was
given to drill a well under a certain application, it would
permit the appropriation of water for a given and definite acreage. January 1st 'vas termed the end of each
harvest season. Consequently the only reasonable construction that can be given to the payment provision is
this : When permission to drill under a certain application should be granted by the state engineer, the acreage
for which that particular 'veil was applied should be put
into crops. On or before each . January 1st thereafter
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(which was termed the end of the harvest season) there
would become due in cash the sum of $10.00 for each acre
which the application called for to be irrigated thereunder, together with interest at 5% per annum on the payments so becoming due, until the full purchase price with
interest has been paid. "rhe $2600 . 00 down payment was
to apply as a credit on the next -payment which became
due and payable on January 1st, 1947. Of course, if no
payment should become due under -the previous provisions of the contract, the court 'vould construe such credit
to apply on the first payment which would fall due. Payments of $10.00 per acre on the acreage tilled and cropped
were undoubtedly to become due each year until the purchase price was paid. No doubt the printed portion of the
contract requiring monthly payments would be considered ·
as· surplusage and of no effect since the express written
provisions would be controlling under all rules of construction.
The parties must have had a sufficient discussion
concerning the terms of payment and plaintiff was satisfied with the language because he testified (Tr. 11):
''This contract was drawn up by McGarry and in reading
it over and signing it in the office, from what I got of it,
I had asked to have that ("until the full purchase price,
together with interest") put in. It seemed to me the
best thing to do. And Mr. 1\{cGarry signed that.''
The case of Cummings t~s. Nielsen, 129 Pac. 619, 4~
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Utah 157, is some,vhat analogous to the situation at bar.
A contention was there made that the ag-reement was uncertain because no time 'vas fixed within which the appellants were required to exercise an option. Answering
that arg·ument the court stated that ''it is elementary that
in equity that is certain 'vhich can be made certain.'' The
court held- also that definiteness under the circumstances
could always be shown by extrinsic, parol or documentary
evidence .. Also that it "ras the duty of the court to scrutinize carefully, the language used by the parties and in
doing so ascertain therefrom, if possible, the intention of
the parties and to enforce such intention.
See also Johnson vs. Jones, 164 Pac. (2nd) 893, 109
Utah 92.
\\T e think the correct statement of law is set forth in

Patterson et al., vs. Chambers' Power Co., 159 Pac. 568
(Ore) wherein it is said: "It is a well recognized principle of legal cons~ruction that a contract will not be held
void for indebtedness when by considering it as a whole
and taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances the true intent of the parties can be ascertained.''
I-Io,vever, it would seem that the question of whether
the contract is uncertain is of no importance in this case
since the plaintiff could never be confronted with how
much acreage should be tilled and cropped and when
and what payments would become due. Long before the
plaintiff attempted to rescind the contract by serving
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notice or otherwise, and .at a time when he claimed the
contract was n·ot in default he filed applications to change
the point of diversion of. the "\Vells _and place of use of
land to be irrigated therefrom, thus showing conclusively
that he did not intend to make any future -payments. The
entire record shows that the plaintiff is attempting to
avoid the agreement because of claimed misrepresentations as to availability of 'vater, and not because the contract was indefinite. He tried to procure a modification
of the agreement to reduce the acreage from 960 to 320
but made no complaint as to the other terms of the agreement.
Besides, the plaintiff having breached the contract
by failure to. till any acreage at all after having secured
permission to drill several-wells on- the ground, and haYing breached the contract in the other respects found by
the court, should be in -no position to thereafter contend
the contract is subject to rescission because of indefiniteness concerning provisions which need not be performed
by him until after such breaches had occurred.

CONTRACT NOT IMPOSSIBLE OF PERFORMANCE
Appellant takes the position that the contract is impossible of performance, and for such reason is invalid.
If it is impossible of performance it is because there is
no water available in the Beryl District for the irrigation of land. It cannot be said there is 'vater available
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in the district but not for the specific tract of land mentioned in the contract. The plaintiff's o'vn course of conduct and his actions belie this present contention. Plaintiff has not drilled any 'veils on the ground under purchase although permission was granted by the state engineer to drill three wells. He never applied for permis·sion to drill more, although permission could have been
procured to do so. The state en~ineer testified that the
wells in the Beryl district produced an average of from
2 to 2.5 second feet of water (Tr. 139). Each application was made on the basis of irrigating· about 40 acres
per second foot. _ Therefore the plaintiff might reasonably anticipate he could irrigate 80 to 100 acres from each
well or about 300 acres from the -three wells. He could
have. secured permission to drill more wells by asking
for such permission and showing ability to put them
down. Plaintiff purchased other land in the Beryl dis-.
trict and put down wells, and consequently he did not
and does not believe the contract impossible of performance. It is reasonable to believe _that plaintiff would not
buy other land and go to the expense of putting do,vn
wells unless he had good reason to believe there was water
available in the underground basin to justify such purchase and expense. If water is not available on other
and adjoining ground the plaintiff could and would have
produced proof to that effect in the trial of this cause.
Not having put any wells do,vn on the ground he purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chased from defendant he cannot say that the contract is
impossible of performance because 'vater is not available.
It should be borne in mind that defendent offered to modify the contract by permitting plaintiff to purchase 320
acres of land and retain sufficient water filing to irrigate such land but plaintiff refused to assign to defendant the water filings for the irrigation of the premises
not being purchased. This would indicate conclusively
that plaintiff had faith in. the value and worth of these
water filings but wanted to use them elsewhere.
Finding No. 9 (R. 72) is to the effect that the Beryl
underground basin 'vas greatly.

over-appropriat~d

at

the time the. contract was made unless many prior ap- ·
propriators or applicants under then pending applications failed to use their appropriations or proposed appropriations. We call attention to Finding No. 24 (R. 76)
that many wells were drilled in the Beryl area and in the
vicinity of the premises described in said contract in the
year 1946 and also during the years 1947 and 1948,
nearly all of which wells are producing water for irrigation purposes. In other words, the evidence shows and
the court found that in the three years following the making of said contract many wells have been drilled and are
producing water for irrigation of premises in the vicinity
of the premises in question. Bearing in mind that the
contract does not provide for a sale of any water and
plaintiff does not contend that defendant guaranteed or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

even represented that a well would produce any given
amount of water, and bearing in mind there is no proof
that the district even three years after the making of
said contract is over-pumped, it is difficult to see how
the contract is impossible of performance.
JUDG~IENT

FINDS SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE.
FIKDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

~

In its ~Iemorandum of Decision the court concluded
that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was
subject to rescission because of· misrepresentation as to
availability of water for irrigation of said lands. The
court concluded that the defendant, however, should not
be required the refund the down_ payment received by him
unless the water filings made in connection with the contract be transferred and· assigned to the defendant; that
if the rights acquired under the applications to appropriate water sh<?uld be transferred and assigned to the de:
fendant, the defendant should be required to repay the
plaintiff the $2600.00 down payment, with legal interest
and the fees and expenses paid by plaintiff to procure
said applications; that if such transfers are not made
then defendant should be released from any obligation
to convey the real estate involved or to refund the down
payment and the contract should be declared terminated.
The court permitted plaintiff .fifteen days to give notice
as to whether such water applications would be transfelTed. (R.. 68).
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The trial court concluded that since the plaintiff
took no steps to rescind the contract, after notice of the
facts under which he claimed the right to rescind, and
until long after the Governor's proclamation withdrawing the Beryl underground district from further water
appropriations, he should not in equity be permitted to
retain all water filings for use elsewhere against the express terms of the contract and receive back the entire
down payme_nt and be relieved from further obligation
under the contract, thus leaving the defendant or defendant's successor in interest without the right to appropriate water. The court concluded that if the water filing·s
did not accord to the plaintiff the water right to which
he claimed he was entitled and as a consequence plaintiff
should be relieved from his obligations under the contract with a return of his down payment, then the water
rights represent-ed. by such· filings, such as they are and
for what they are worth, should be left to the defendant
with the land in accordance with the express agreement
of the parties. The court concluded that the plaintiff
should either rescind the contract in its entirety or not
at all. The court concluded the defendant, as 'vell as
the plaintiff, was entitled to be placed in status quo; and
also concluded that if the plaintiff was entitled· to relief
after waiting many months to rescind the contract and
after no further .water might be appropriated for the irrigation of the land, then the defendant was entitled to
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the filing-s 'vhich were made as a part of the deal between
plaintiff and defendant. The court believed, and it could
not believe other,Yise, that the applications for filings
were made as a direct result of the purchase of the land
and for the benefit of the land being purchased and with
the definite understanding and agreement that the water
represented by such filing·s would become a part of the
land and remain with the land in case of default, and
therefore the plaintiff should not oe entitled to rescind
the contract and receive back his- down payment because
of an insufficiency of water without leaving at least the
insufficient supply with the land.

RESPONDENT'S

CROSS-ASSIGN~iENT

OF ERROR

The respondent and defendant assigns the following
cross-assignment of errors committed by the trial court,
to-wit:
1. In making that portion of finding No. 9 which
finds that representations made by defendant to plaintiff
as to the availability of water for appropriation were
untrue. ( R. 72).
2. In making its conclusion of law No. 1 concluding
that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was
subject to rescission by plaintiff because of any misrepresentation by defendant as to availability of water for
irrigation of lands. (R. 77).
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3. For failing to make an express conclusion that
the failure of the plaintiff to rescind the said contract
upon discovery of the alleged misrepresentation by defendant as to the availability of water for irrigation of
said lands, or upon receiving information sufficient to
put him upon notice that statements concerning the availability of water were not true, and the failure of the
plaintiff to rescind after learning that the state engineer
questioned the availability of water, waived his right to
rescind, and that the attempt to rescind on January 5th,
1947, was not timely.

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-ASSIGNl\lENT OF ERRORS
Respondent will pres~nt his argument on the above
cross-assignments in connection "\\ith his argument that
the appellant was not entitled to rescind the contract because (Conclusion No. 2, R. ·77) he has not offered to rescind the contract in its entirety but demands. a return of
the down payment and. cancellation of the contract and
asserts the right to retain all of the water filings and
applications. We will discuss first the legal propositions
involved and afterwards the factual situation.
It is the position of respondent that the plaintiff "ras
not entitled to rescind the contract and cannot prevail
in this cause for the following reasons:
1. One retaining benefits of a contract and continuing to treat it as binding is deemed to haYe waived fraud

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
and elected to affirm the contract, and a party cannot
rescind on grounds of fraud when, after knowledge, he·
affirms it.
2. A contract must be rescinded in ~ts entirety, and
the complaining party cannot affirm in part and rescind
in part.
3. One claiming to have been defrauded must act
promptly and any action in delaying the rescission to
obtain an advantage is a ratification of the original
agreement.
4. One who has opportunity to know the facts constituting alleged fraud, or who learns the facts, cannot
remain inactive and thereafter rescind the contract.
Propositions 1 and 2 as above stated, can, for the
purpose of this discussion, be treated together.
A statement of events and dates will no doubt be

helpful.
The contract was made on December 7th, 1945.
(Pltf 's. Ex. A). The applications to appropriate water
were made immediately or within a day or so thereafter,
and were received in the office of the state engineer on
December 13th, 1945. ( Tr. 90). On 1\{arch 2nd, 1946, the
state engineer sent a letter to Vern Frailey concerning
a11 of the applications and stated among other things "1
feel certain that your applications will not ·receive favo:._able consideration for at least a year." (Pltf's. Ex. B. Tr.
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67). On or about March 29th, 1946, a meeting 'vas held
- at the Wells School House at Beryl, in which the farmers expressed themselves as being willing to have the
present outstanding applications approved and as believing sufficient water to be· available without impairing
the underground water basin up to that point. (Tr. 104-5).
On April lOth, 1946, the Governor of Utah by proclamation suspended the right of the public to appropriate surplus or unappropriated waters in the B-eryl area. (Deft's.
Ex. 11; Tr. 134). On April 21st, 1946, Frailey sent a letter to the state engineer saying, ''I believe it would be
most advantageous to us if we be permitted to drill wells
Nos.17118 and 17121." (Deft's. Ex. 2; .Tr. ql). On April
25th, 1946, the state engineer sent Frailey a letter saying,
''We can no"\v act upon the applications filed individually and it is believed that there is underground water
that may be appropriated." (Deft's. Ex. 3; Tr. 52-55).
This letter also states that it 'vas the unanimous opinion
of all water users present in the meeting that more wells
could be drilled without seriously interfering with existing rights and again saying Frailey could drill two 'vells.
On May 23rd, 1946, :B.,railey sent a letter to the state engineer saying he wanted to change the location of the
wells and asking if McGarry could prohibit him from so
doing. (Deft's. Ex. 4; Tr. 56-75). On l\Iay 31st, 1946, the
state engineer sent a letter to Frailey saying there ·was
no reason why such a change application could not he
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filed if Frailey had not entered into a contract that would
prohibit it, and advising· there wa~ nothing to prevent a
change application before Frailey was in default under
his contract. (Deft's. Ex. 5; Tr. 58-59). On June 13th,
1946, Mr. Isom, Frailey's attorney, advised the state
engineer by letter that ''Frailey has decided to let the
land go back and forfeit the contract but he is not yet in
default and wants to move the wells off· first.'' (Deft's.
Ex. 6; Tr. 59 to 61). On June 14th,'1946~ the change applications were fi~ed. (Tr. 94). On August 9th, 1946,
Thompson filed change applications. (Tr. 95). On January 15th, 1947, notice of rescission was given by plaintiff to defendant, (Deft's. Ex. 1). All change applications were duly protested by McGarry.
From the outline of events and dates- it is yery
clear that the plaintiff brought the action for rescission
of the contract, not because of any claimed fraud or misrepresentation or because he thought no water would be
available to irrigate the ground, but because he did not
want to proceed with the purchase of the entire tract and
could not hope to avoid the provision of the contract
which provides the seller would become the assignee of
\Vater applications in case of a default, unless the contract could be rescinded and held to be of no force and
effect. The matter of water applications was then of
paramount importance because Frailey could not file on
additional water after the governor's proclamation, and
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by the same token the defendant, or any subsequent purchaser of the land, could not file upon or procure other
or additional water. It is also clear that after the state
engineer gave the hint to Frailey that he could perhaps
move the location of the wells and place of use, before
his contract was in default, and after Attorney Isom gave
him similar advice, Frailey and Thompson then filed
their applications to get their wells moved before serving
nny notice of rescission. There would have been no lawsuit and no attempt to rescind the contract had there
been no proclamation suspending the right to make more
filings. That is shGwn conclusively by Attorney Isom's
letter to the state engineer on June 13th, 1946, stating·
''Frailey has decided to let the land go back and forfeit
the contract which is not yet in default and wants to
move the wells off first.'' At that time he had in mind to
default and rescission was an afterthought. When defendant protested the change applications on the ground
that the contract prohibited such a removal, then and
then only the idea of rescis~ding the contract occurred
to him or his advisers. All that Frailey wanted in the
first instance, after tire contract 'vas signed, was to reduce the acreage under his contract from 960 acres to
320 acres, and to keep all of the water filings. He made
that very proposition to McGarry but at that time made
no claim to a right o-f rescissio·n or a return of his down
payment.
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The follo,ving· provision in the contract is clear, definite and certain, nor is it contended either by Frailey or
Thompson that they were misled into so agreeing, or
that they did not kno'v the clear purport of the language
and its effect, to-"'"it:
It is agTeed that in the event the buyer or any
assig·nee shall make application to appropriate
water or shall procure a certificate of appropriation
to appropriate water or shall procure a certificate
to appropriate water from wells located upon the
said premises and said buyer or a·ssignee or assignees shall thereafter default in this contract, the
seller shall immediately become the assignee of any
such application or appropriation and the State
Engineer of the State of Utah is hereby authorized
to recognize said seller as the assignee of any such
application and in the event a certificate of appropriation has issued to the said buyer, the water rights
thereunder shall be considered as appurtenant to
the said premises and in the event of default, the
title thereto shall immediately pass to the seller.
The applications represented something of value to
the defendant in the event of a failure of the plaintiff to
proceed under the contract. They represented something
of value to the plaintiff and the plaintiff would not rescind the contract until after he and Thompson had procured permission to drill three wells and filed change applications on such wells and all of the ·other wells represented by their filings or applications, so that the land
would be deprived of the benefit of water filings and
\\'ater to be procured thereunder and so that the provi ..
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sion of the contract with respect to water would be rendered nugatory.
It will be recalled that the plaintiff was advised by
the state engineer as early as March 2nd, 1946, that there
was a grave question concerning the right to secure favorable consideration to drill wells for at least one year.
Thereafter plaintiff asked permission to drill two wells
and Thompson asked permission to drill one well and both
secured such permissiqn. Plaintiff is now asking that the
contract be rescinded and held of no binding force and
effect, which would permit him not only to recover back
the down payment, but retain the . benefits represented
by the water applications and well rights, turning back
the land after he had remained · in possession for one
year during which time the right to secure water for said
Jand had been lost through the governor's proclamation
suspending further applications.
In the offer. of rescission plaintiff neither tendered
back the possession of the premises nor offered to return
the water applications, but on the contrary he has retained and used and intends to retain and use all of the
benefits to be had from these applications.
Plaintiff has therefore elected to affirm the contract
as to his right to the filings and applications, and has
taken and used the water, (as has Thompson also), from
two of the wells which have been drilled. He cannot be
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permitted to affirm the contract in part and rescind as
to part.

''It is "'"ell settled that, if the complaining
party has allowed a change to take place so as to
modify the situation with reference to the property
inYolved, or, if he retains benefits under the original or ne"'" contract, then rescission will not be declared. In Appleman, et al., vs. Pepis, 117 Okl.
199, 246 Pac. 225, the rule is stated as follows:
'\\.,..here a party to a contract pursues a course of
action that expresses an intention to be bound by
the contract and expresses an intention to enjoy the
benefits of the contract, he cannot then escape the
burdens of the contract.' The_rule is stated by the
Sup.reme Court of Utah in the case of LeVine vs.
Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. ·2 (Ann. Cas.
19120 407), as follows : 'A party misled must, as
soon as he learns the truth and discovers the falsity
of statements relied on, disaffirm the contract with
all reasonable diligence, and he cannot derive all
possible benefit from the transaction and then
claim relief from his own obligation by a rescission
or refusal to execute.' To the same effect are the
follo"ring authorities: Fa-rmers' State Bank · vs.
n·arrington, 225 Pac. 705; Croak vs. Trentman, 150
Pac. 1088." Evans rs. Turney, 61 Pac. 2nd, 237.
The above case of Evans YS. Turney is also authoritl.
for the proposition that before there may· be a rescission
there must be a failure of the entire consideration of the
contract.
In the case at bar plaintiff does not contend that he
did not receive the right to drill some wells, nor does he
contend that for the irrigation seasons of 1946, 1947 and
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1948 the wells s~ drilled did not produce ample water or
that water was not available from the wells. Neither does
plaintiff contend that he and Thompson could not have
secured permission to drill wells under their other applications had they· so applied. Thompso·n and Frailey
both admit they never requested permission beyond the
three wells for which they obtained the right to drill, and
~fr. Ward testified they could have go~ten permission to
drill all of the wells had they so applied and shown to the
state engineer that they had the means of putting down
the wells and would use the wells in the actual irrigation
of land. (Tr. 132-133).
The case of LeVine, et al vs. Whitehouse, et al, 37
Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2, is very illustrative of the .proposition that a person claiming to ·have been defrauded 'vill
lose his right to rescind if he takes· any benefit under the
contract or doe·s any other act implying intent to abide
by or affirm it, afte~.: he becomes aware of the claimed
Jro.ud. Also the LeVine case holds :.
•

A party misled must, as soon as he learns the
truth and discovers the falsity of statements relied
on, disaffirm the contract with all reasonable dili·
gence, and he cannot derive all possible benefit from
the transaction and then claim relief from his o'vn
obligation by a rescission or refusal to execute.
A party to a contract tainted with, and who is
injured by fraud may either affirm the contract and
sue for damages or disaffirm and sue for cancellation, but, if he rescinds, he must rescind the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tract in its entirely, and if he affirms, he must affirm "~holly and not in part. Cattell vs. Denver
State Bank, ~~5 Pac. 271 (Colo).
We call the court's attention to the very recent case
of Morse vs. Kogle, cited at 178 Pac. (2nd) 275 (Kan),
which tersely reviewing the authorities concerning the
necessity of rescinding promptly upon discovery of the
alleged fraud, holds that treating a contract as binding
after having knowledge of the alleged fraud is an affirmation and is then not subject to rescission.
Where a party, with knowledge of facts entitling him to rescission of a contract, afterward,
without fraud or duress, ratifies the same, he has
no claim to the relief of cancellation. An express
ratification is not required in order thus to defeat
his remedy; any acts of recognition of the contract
as subsisting or any conduct inconsistent with an·
intention of avoiding it, have the effe·ct of an election to affirm. Indeed it has been declared that
since the remedy of rescission is not held in high
esteem by the courts, even slight circumstances
showing a purpose or intent to 'vaive it will preclude the allowance of such relief. * * * Sec. 38
Cancellation of Instruments, 12 C. J. S. page 996.
As a general rule the receipt of benefits under
the contract, or acts of dominion or o'vnershi p exercised over the property received under the contract
after knowledge of the ground of rescission amount
to a ratification. This is especially true if plaintiff, with knowledge of his right to rescind, has so
dealt with the property as to make. restoration
thereof impossible. * * * He cannot occupy the
inconsistent po~ition of going on \Vith the contract
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and at the same time claiming the right to rescind
it, nor can he vacillate or delay. Sec. 38 (b) Cancellation of Instruments, 12 C. J. 8. page 998-citing numerous cases.
The authorities on the foregoing propositions are so
numerous and universal, they could be multiplied almostwithout end.
Even though it could conceivably be held that applying for and receiving permission to- drill wells long before any change _applications were made, retaining the
benefits of such wells for use on other ground, and as
Frailey testified, making demand for an abstract of title
in the fall of 1946, and applying for change applic~tions:
was not an affirmation of the contract, most certainly the
poi'ition taken by Frailey on J urie 13th, 1946, ·was definite. On that. date_ 1\Ir. Isom sent a letter to the state
- engine·er in which it was stated: '-,,Frailey has decided to
let thn land go 'ba'ck 'and-forfeit the contract, but he is ~ot
yet in default and- wants to- move the wells off first. He
has '!a sing on the ground and can get a driller.'' That
definitely anchored his position and shows conclusively
that he had no intention of cl~iming a right of rescission,
but on the contrary ~as going to -let his contract go into
default and forfeit his rights thereunder, but would hold
the contract in standing until he could move the wells off
first.
Addressing our attention now to propositions 3 and
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4, we submit the following authorities which are over""helming and universally followed by the courts of all
jurisdictions :
If a party has been defrauded by another, he
must act promptly and at once restore or offer to
return the property '\\rhich he has received. After
discovery of a fraud, if the party affected thereby
does anything in procuring an extension of a performance of the terms of the agreement out of which
some unjust advantag·e is undertaken to be obtained,
his action in such respect constitutes a ratification
of the original contract. Hewitt vs. Andreu;s, 140
Pac. 437 (Ore).
The general rule that the purchaser 'vaives his
right to rescind by failure to exercise it promptly on
discovery of the grounds applies where the ground
relied on is mistake, duress, failure to procure the
conveyance within the limited time, or deficiency
in quantity. ]fcKellar Real Estate & Investment
Co. vs. Paxton, 218 Pac. 128, at page 132, 62 Utah 97.
In this connection it must b~ remembered that the
plaintiff went into possession of the premises described
in the contract, (Tr. 163), did some work thereon, and at
no time offered to· return possession of the premises to
the defendant. As a matter of. fact, even the notice of
recsission served about January 15th, 1947, did not offer
to return the posseHsion of the premises to defendant.
Had the defendant entered into the possession of the
premises, at least at any time up to the service of the
notice of rescission over a year after the contract "\\'as
made, he would have been guilty of an unlawful and foreSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ible entry and detainer. See Paxton vs. Dearden, 45 Pac.
(2nd) 903, 86 Utah 408.
Concerning the matter of posses-sion of the premises,
at the trial- the plaintiff attempted to discount the legaJ
effect of having retained possession for over a year after
entering into the contract J>y contending that he and
Thompson were not in physical possession and the ground
'vas open where defendant could have gone on it and
taken the possession. It is not explained just how plain-·
tiff could have expected defendant to take possession until
plaintiff had served a notice of rescission and thus ad-·
vised defendant that the ·contract· was being abandoned.
. 'l,he letter of plaintiff's counsel to the state engineer in
.June of 1946 stated that the plaintiff was not in default,
'vhich is equivalent to claiming he was entitled to possCls'3i on of the premises under the contract. Before serving
notice of rescission, the entire course ·of conduct indicated
ihat he 'vas proceeding under the contract.
This court ("\V ash.) has been .more than liberal,
even generous, in allowing a rescission of fraudulently induced contracts for the purchase of land,
but our attention is called to no cases holding that
a vendee can, after ample time to ascertain the
facts, and after undertaking to turn the land into
a fair bargain on his own account, and after a lapse
of several months rescind his contract. Pearson t'S.
Gullans, 142 Pac. 456.
A party misled must, as soon as he learns the
truth and discovers the falsity of statements relied
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on, disaffirm the contract 'vith all reasonable diligence. Le V~ine vs. Whitehouse, 109 Pac. 2, 37 Utah
260.
The justify the rescission, the party seeking to
avail himself of that ren1edy must move promptly
and with all reasonable diligence to disaffirm the
contract upon discovery of the fraud. He must restore both parties to their original position. He is
not allowed to go on deriving all possible benefit
from the transaction, and then claim to be relieved
from his own obligations by seeking its rescission.
Taylor vs. Moore, 51 Pac. (2nd) 222, at page 227, 87
Utah 493.
The Taylor case above cited also holds: The means of
Knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A party who has
lpportunity of knowing the facts constituting the alleged
,·raud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want
•f knowlf~dge that arose by reason of his own ]atchcs
; 1nd negligence.
Notice of acts and circumstances putting a man
of ordinary intelligence and prudenc-e upon inquiry
is equivalent to knowledge of fraud necessary to an
acquiescence in the fraut. Whitney vs. Bissell, 146
Pac. 141.
The case of Zuniga, et al.; vs. Leone, et al., 297 Pac.
tOlO, 77 Utah 494, sets forth the established law on this
~ubject wherein it is h~ld the right to rescind a contract
is gone after ratifying it. This court upheld the lower
~ourt in refusing to permit a rescission, even though it
tppeared there had been a misrepresentation concerniu~
\Ito value of a stock of merchandise. This -court anSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nounced the universal rule as follows:
A purchaser has merely an election to rescind
for fraud or misrepresentation of the vendor, the
·contract being voidable and not void, and his rig·ht
to rescin-d is gone after he has once ratified or affirmed the contract, either expressly or impliedly,
as to recognizing or treating it as binding or accepting benefits under it 'vith full knowledge of the
fraud or misrepresentation and of his legal rights.
In the Zuniga case above cited the plaintiff vv·ith
kn0wledge of the facts about which they complained, retained the occupation and use of the real property for
over a year, sold the merchandise and entered into an
.agreement modifying the original contract. It "Tas held
this amounted to a recognition and treatment of the eontract as va~id which precluded a rescission. In the casH
at bar, the plaintiff did not attempt any rescission for
over a year, and while he did not enter into an agreement
for 9. modification of the original contract, he did nep;o
tiate for such modification and offered to· proceed with
the purchase of a part of the land.
We do not know whether the plaintiff is urging that
there is not sufficient "rater available to irrigate the land
at this time or whether there may not be sufficient 'vater
available ·in the years to come; but in either event, the
information upon whic~ plaintiff now relies was available to him at all times. Particularly after receiving the
state engineer's letter of :1\Iarch 2nd, 1946, plaintiff could
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have secured and had the benefit of all such information.
In his letter to Frailey
dated March 2nd, 1946, the state
.
engineer said: "It is true that there appear to be larg6

quantities of water that are stored in the g_round in this
valley that would perhaps satisfy the proposed diver ..
sions for a year or two, but with the state enginer 's of:
fice this is a serjous problem * * * ' ' Frailey discussed
with the state engineer on the occasion of his. visit on
March 20th or thereabouts the number of outstanding applications, (Tr. 14-77) and knew or could have, learned.
from the records while there what he might expect as to
the availability of water. The state engineer. could have
told him as much then as no_w, and .Frailey knew, or could
have learned from the state engineer's office, as. much
about the availability or lack of. availability of water to
'
irrigate the tract of land in question on March 20th, 1946,
as he knows now or learned at the trial. Any simple inquiry from and discussion with the state engineer would
develop all of the information testified to by Mr. Ward.
In fact, in the light of the state ~ngineer 's letter of March
2nd, 1946, which resulted in Frailey and Thompson going
to see him, it seems inconceivable that Frailey did not
discuss the question of availability of water and was advised of the matters upon which he now relies for a right
of rescission.
If there was no water a vail able to irrigate the tract
in 1945 when the contract was made, and in 1946, the folSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lowjng irrigation season, then Frailey either knew of such
facts as early as March of 1946, or 'vas on notice that ·he
could have ascertained the facts. What did he do about
the

matter~

He failed to attempt to rescind for about

a year. Meanwhile he tried to have the contract modified
by taking and keeping 320 acres of land with all of the
water applications. . He applied for and received permission to drill three wells. During the summer or fall of
1946 he demanded, so he says, that McGarry furnish him
with an abstract of title covering all of the lands, so he
could determine if the title ·was good. He was not particularly concerned about the water situation when he
·drilled a well at considerable expense and when Thompson
also drilled a well. He applied for the right to change
the point of diversion and place of use of all of the water
applications. And then about a year later he claimed the
right to rescind on the theory that water is not available.
That the claim for rescission was not made timely is
amply borne out by his o'vn direct testimony and we neerl
not rely only on his acts. · In January, 1946, about a month
after entering into the contract he beg·an to hear rumors
and stories about not having his applications allowed;
that· he was worried because the applications were not
being advertised and he came to Utah from California
and discussed with various people the matter of his applications not being approved and discussed it 'vith McGarry; that McGarry said it would be best to go to Salt
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Lake to ~ind out about the matter; that he did so and
talked 'vith .1\'Ir. ard; that Mr. Ward clarified his mind
about the matter and he learned that the applications
\vere not going to be approved ( Tr. 13-14); that after talking with the state engineer it took a good deal of thought
on his part to decide what to do and he had a talk ·with
McGarry and could not arrive at anything definite where
he could feel secure in going ahead 'vith the development
of the. ground. He then talked with ~{r. Isom, an attorney at Cedar. (Tr. 16). He the~ told McGarry he was
willing to go ahead. with about 320. acres and narrow the
contract down to something he ~ould handle ; he wanted
to farm what land he could get water for but could not go
ahead on the entir~ tract of land (Tr. 16). Shortly after
that h~ found he could not negotiate with McGarry and
he thought it was better to go into litigation; that he made
a trip to Salt Lake and located a section of state land on
advice from the engineer, and.then attempted to move all
of the well applications; that he bought 640 acres from
the state, and that he put down a well on the land l,>eing
purchased from the state (Tr. 16-17).

''!

In answer to a question concerning whether he could
get permission to drill more than two wells, Frailey
stated:
A.

l

ll

I didn't want to get in any more trouble than
I had. I didn't ".,.ant to go ahead and not have
any understanding how much ground there was.
I offered to buy as much ground as I had water .
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to put on it, what I could obtain for· it, buy the
ground. If at a later time I 'vas allowed more
water I would purchase more ground, either
way. vVe couldn't come to any terms on it.
* * * (Tr. 29) .
.A.

That is when I came to McGarry and offered
to purchase 320 acres, insofar as I was allowed
tentative permission to drill, I wanted to segregate 320 acres which T could pay for and obtain
a deed for. (Tr. 30).

· That in March, 1946, when he secured permission
from the state engineer to drill two wells he then intended
to go through with the McGarry contract, and that was
the time when he thought it best to try to buy only the
320 acres; that when McGarry said he didn't want to
change the contract Frailey then changed his mind; that
it tvas after permission was given to put down the wells
that he concluded he was nof going to proceed with the
McGarry contract. ( Tr. 33-34). That McGarry offered
to cancel the contract and return the money if Frailey
would assign the water applications but that Frailey
wanted to cancel the contract and keep all "rater applications; that he did not want to assign the water applications because after visiting the state engineer he was advised ·by that office the water was not appurtenant to
the land. ( Tr. 3'5).
Frailey concluded he "ras not going' through with the
McGarry contract as early as April or May, 1946, but
failed to serve notice of rescission for some eight month~
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thereafter. Application to relocate the wells for which
permission to drill ",.as granted as in June. Frailey testified as follows :

~-

Q. Now, 'vhen you concluded you was not going
through with this contract, you filed applications with the State Engineer, did you not, to
change the point of diversion and place of use
of some of these· applications?
.A.. That· is right.
(Tr. 36).
Q. From April, until~ I think, January 12th (follo"ring) you made no demand upon Mr. McGarry for either a return of the money or advising him that you 'vas going to rescind the
contract.
A. Nothing official. It took a good deal of thought
to decide to completely seve~r the deal.

Q. In other words, you was thinking about whether
you would or would not rescind the contract
from April, 1946,-until about the middle of January, 1947~
A. Sometimes it takes a good deal of time to locate
an attorney you feel you can go ahead with. I
had tried in Cedar City. I didn't know how
long I could go alone and the attorney not going here to take the case. I was cogitating a
good deal trying to determine whether to go
through with it or have a lawsuit.
Q. That is your explanation of the delay~
A. Yes, sir. I was extremely busy.
Q.

* * * * *
Weren't you advised by your counsel in the
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summer of 1946 that your contract was not yet
in default and that you had better move this
water before it was in default~
A. I believe I was.
Q. Surely. Isn't it a fact that- _you deliberately
held back from attempting to rescind this contract until you had the advantage of moving
this water while your contract was still alive
and in force~
A. Well, the transactions all went on at that
time. I don't kno'v \Vhether I deliberately held
back. I 'vas deliberating, negotiating, studying
it. There was quite a bit of business going on
at that time.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

.LL\..

* * * * *
During the year (1946) no \veils \vere drilled
on this 1\{cGarry gr~und ~
That is right.
Since about April of 1946 you have had no intention of drilling any wells on that ground.
I don't recall the exact date, as I say, that I
had any intention of drilling wells, it was after
my meeting with McGarry, I went to Mr. Me·
Garry with Mr. Isom and tried to negotiate on
some smaller tract of ground, some time after
that, why I decided there was no soap.
When you was advised that you would be allowed three wells and you had no assurance any
others would be allowed, \vhy didn't you rescind
the ·contract then and there~
Well, it took a good deal of thought to decide,
that is why I tried to negotiate for a smaller
piece of ground.
(Tr. 39).
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We call partieular attention to the testimony of
Frailey on pages 41 to 50 of the transcript or bill of exceptions, from which it becomes apparent that Frailey
wanted his cake and wanted to eat it too-that he wanted
to go through with the deal when he demanded an abstract as late as September; that he decided not to go
through with the deal when he filed the change applications in June; that he wanted to modify the contract so
he could keep all the water and buy 320 acres of ground,
but keep an option on the balance; that when he filed the
change applications he might decide to move the wells
back to the :NicGarry ground, etc. etc.

THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A FINDING .OF MISREPRESENTATION
Up to at least July of 1945, and perhaps for several
months thereafter, water was appropriated merely by
having prepared and by filing with the state engineer a
formal application therefor and permission to drill a well
was given quickly thereafter. (Tr. 123).
The extent of the representations as to availability
of water is as shown by Frailey's testimony. McGarry
said there was an underground lake and an abundance of
water flowing underground and that there had never
been any trouble in obtaining plenty of water for irrigation. (Tr. 8). That McGarry told him of the amount of
water available in the valley, that there had been no
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draw down in thirty years; that they had a large lake un.
derlying the valley and an underground stream feeding
it from the hills. (Tr. 19). That McGarry told him he
might drill a well and produce water from it but McGarry
did not say and he did not inquire as to the procedure
thereafter; that- if permission was granted to drill a
well, that would give him all McGarry promised or told
him about. (Tr. 27). It is quite obvious that Frailey was
not concerned particularly about any failure of water
supply because after having received permission to drill
t'\ 0 W(llls Frailey wanted to ·purchase 320 acres of the
tract in question and obtain a deed therefor, and ,'if more
-wells were allowed, I could go ahead and get more land,''
and at that time Frailey had no intention of applying for
more wells or putting more down. (Tr. 43-44). McGarry
testified that when the contract was signed it was rumored there was a little concern in the state enginer's
_office that because of applications coming in at quite a
heavy rate they might be slow in allowing the applications and for that reason the clause in the contract ''on
any and all lands where water well permits are granted
and allowing water for any given acreage, said acreage
is to be tilled and cropped'' was inserted. ( Tr. 156). McGarry denied that he represented to Frailey that all of
the applications would be allowed by the state engineer
or that he would be given permission to drill a well for
each of the applications in sixty days after the date of
1
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filing them. (Tr. 157).
The express provisions in the contract concerning
payments thereunder only on lands for which well permits have been granted not only lends credence to the defendant's testimony, but there would be absolutely no
purpose in such a provision if it was agreed and intended
that all of the W'ell permits would be allowed within sixty
days.
In any event Frailey received permission to drill all
the wells he intended to put down during 1946. He has
never since requested permission to drill more wells and
Mr. Ward testified that such permission could be secured
upon proper_showing of ability to put them down and put
the water to a beneficial use. In fact the state engineer
''was anxious'' to have all applicants in the Beryl district get their wells down so he might, have future data
as to the availability of water. (Tr. 132).
\

There is not onB vvord of testimony in the entire record to the effect that McGarry knew or that it was impossible to secure "\Vater rights to irrigate the lands. Mr.
Ward testified that until about July 10, 1945, and perhaps as late as September 10, 1945, applications were approved as a matter of course "\vithin a fe"\v days after
being received in his office; that sometime .thereafter the
state engineer's office adopted the policy of withholding
permission to drill 'vells, but he did not know and had no
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record of when that policy was adopted; that no public
announcement was made of such policy. (Tr. 104 and
124). The record does not disclose whether the change
of poliey 'vas before or after the Frailey contract was
executed.
The only serious charge of misrepresentation in the
amended complaint which can possibly stand as a basis
for an alleged fraud is the all~gation that defendant represented there was ample water available and that he
knew it was impossible to secure a sufficient water right
to irrigate the lands described in the complaint. It is,
therefore, important to discuss this charge at some length.
We submit there is no sufficient proof as to lack of ample
water available to irrigate the land, and ni sufficient
proof that the defendant knew it was impossible to secure
a sufficient water right.
In his letter of April 25, 1946, after the governor's
proclamation suspending further applications, the state
engineer stated ''it is believed that there is underground
water that may be appropriated." (Tr. 54). The letter
also gave permission to drill two wells and state~ it was
the unanimous opinion of all water users present at the
meeting on .March 20th that more wells could be drilled
without seriously interfering with existing rights.
In com.menti:rig on the following testimony we do
not set forth the specific transcript pag·e reference to each
bit of testimony since it is not practicable to do so, but
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these facts are all sho,vn by ~lr.
\vhich is not very lengthy.

' :rard in his testimony

Frailey and Thompson never applied for permission
to drill more than three wells. If they had, such permission would have been g·ranted, providing they were in a
position to put down the wells and put the water to a
beneficial use. None of the applications have ever been
rejected. They we!"e all advertised as required by law
and no protests were filed. About 40 wells were put down
in 1946, about 40 more in 1947, and still more in 1948.
There is no evidence that such 'veils did not produce water
or that water was not available therefrom. Many applications were filed after the Frailey and Thompson applications were filed. As the water table is lowered in the
Beryl district Mr. 'Vard would expect a lesser drop
thereafter because the sage and other vegetation and
wild plant life would not then use up and take from .the
ground a considerable amount of water. Neither Ward
nor Frailey nor anyone else has claimed that the numerous wells which were put down in 1946, 1947 and 1948
were dry holes or produced but a minor quantity of
\Vater. No one, includin-g ~Ir. Ward, claims that wells
have been abandoned because there is no water available,
or even that water· rig·hts have been affected through an
overpumping of the valley. No wells have been ordered
shut down or have voluntarily ceased operations through
lack of water. The 'vater table between the years 1936
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to and including 1946, a period of eleven years, has gone
down less than three feet-2.80 feet to be exact. Some
of the years there was a lowering of the water table and
some of the years it was raised. Mr. Ward did not claim,
nor did anyone else, that such a lowering of the water
table constituted a serious depletion of the water

s~pply,

or left any of the lands for which water was applied with.out an adequate or available supply. On the contrary,
all of the figures, excepting perhaps the year 1946, were
available and known to the state engineer when he held
the meeting "\\ ith the water u~ers at the "'\Veils school, and
when the water users unanimously expressed the belief
that more wells could be drilled without interfering with
existing rights. Moreover, these figures were available
when the state engineer granted permission to drill wells
in 1946, 1947 and 1948, and when he advised Frailey that
he believed there was underground water that might be
appropriated. True it is that Mr. Ward gave it as his
opinion there was not sufficient water ''to take care of
all of the filings made prior to December, 1945~ '' But he
also testified that only a small number_ of wells under
such applications had been put down or were being
pumped, and that the wells which were being pumped
when the Frailey contract was signed had ''hardly any
effect on the water table-that the effect was negligible."
lV£~. Ward did not profess to know how many of the prior
applications will ever be used, and if so whether in sev7
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eral years from no'v or twenty years from now. It is
significant that the state engineer is anxious for all ap·
plicants, including Frailey and Thompson, to get their
'veil~ down, so the effect on the water table may be determined. If the state engineer is at all sure there is no
w'ater available for these additional wells, or that no
·,vater was available in 1946, it was clearly his duty to
reject all such applications. It is also to be noted that
the availability of water, so far as future years are concerned, is greatly enhanced, and the Frailey and Thompson applications made more secure by the subsequent
proclamation of the governor suspending further applications until this question can be definitely answered at
some time in the future .

.

.

•

It is pertinent to ask-was water available to irrigate the land in December of 1945 when the Frailey contract was written? The answer must be in the affirmative, since in the neighborhood of one hundred wells were
subsequently put down-about forty in l946, about forty
in 1947 and a number in 1948. The following question
and answer sums the entire situation up in a nutshell.

Q.

(Asked of n1r. Ward). When these Frailey and
Thompson applications were made in Decem. .
ber, 1945, and had you granted permission to
drill those seven wells, and had they (Frailey
and Thompson) drilled those seven wells in the
spring of 1946, is it your judgment there was
water then and there available to irrigate the
acreage mentioned in those applications.
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A.

If you exclude all the wells that weren't drilled
covered by applications filed prior to December 13th, I "rould say yet. If you don't I would
say no._
(,.fr. 137).

This case was tried in the fall of 1948. About 100
wells were drilled subsequent to the execution of the contract in 1946, 1947 and 1948, and the average well produces 2 to 2.5 second feet of water. Yet three years after
the drilling of about forty of these wells;two years after
the drilling of about eighty of these wells, and after the
irrigation season of the third year, neither the state engineer's office nor the plaintiff can make any claim that
the wells were going dry or had depreciated in wat~r
supply or that the general availability of water was questioned.
It is not claimed that 1\fcGarry guaranteed or that
it was intended or expected he would gu~rantee water
would remain available for a definite number or for all
future years. He did not guarantee nor was it intended
or expected he would guarantee that the state engineer
would not. thereafter permit many other and later applicants to put down wells and perhaps deplete the water
supply. The contract does not provide nor was it intended that McGarry would or could in future years control the availability of water. Is there any claim that
McGarry assured plaintiff the water supply would hold
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up in the future years, irrespective of contingencies,
drouth, or what not 1 The fact remains that in 1946 and
up to the present time there IS available water. The fact
remains that the state engineer does not now claim there
is no water available for the Thompson and Frailey applications, nor does the state engineer make any pretense
that he knows when water will not be available. The
most that can be said about the engineer '-s concern over
the availability of water. is that ~if everyone with an application actually puts down a well and pumps water
consistently therefrom, and if all previous well rights are
in use, there will not be a sufficient supply. Apparently
there were 371 wells in existence when a survey was
made between 19B9 and 1940, and covering wells drilled
· before 1935. Only 23 of that number 'vere being us·ed for
irrigation purposes in March, 1946, when the state engineer met with the farmers. The remaining wells were
drill~d and dug primarily to satisfy homestead requirements. 11any of the 284 remaining wells had only irrigated a very small acreage of ground and the limit of the
right of the well owners would be the small acreage which
had previously been irrigated, a very small water right.
Many have :hot been pumped in twenty years. Eightyseven of the remaining- 284 'vells were domestic or stock
\\Tatering wells that are no cause for concern. (Tr. 128 to
130). Of course numerous wells have been drilled and
in use since 1940, but in expressing the opinion that there
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is ·not sufficient water to satisfy all well rights the state
engineer takes into consideration the use of all of the
foregoing 371 wells, notwithstanding in 1946 only 23 were
being used as irrigation wells and many had not been used
for upwards of t'venty years.
It is well settled that the fraud involved must
relate to facts then existing or which have previously existed. Citing 12 R. C. L. 254; annotation
in 51 A. L. R. at page 49. Nielson vs. Leamington
Mines and Exploration Corporation, 48 Pac. (2nd)
439, at page 442, 87 "Qtah 69.
·Since there was no shortage of water in 1945 when
the contract was made, and in 1946 when permission to
drill wells was given to Thompson and Frailey, and since
all the evidence shows without doubt that water was available at that ti·me, irrespective of what might happen in
the years to come, the above principle of law laid qown
by this court in the above cited Nielson case is applicable.
"\Ve insist that the· plaintiff himself believes water
1s available for the irrigation of the lan~s in question.
If he did not and does not think so then why did he and
Thompson drill the wells that have been drilled~ Why
have they so strenuously insisted on the right to retain
all of the water filings~ If there is no water available
to irrigate land, the applications have no value, yet plaintiff thin~s they have a value of excess of $3000.00, be·
cause under the decision of the court he could collect such
an amount which is the down payment 'vith interest to
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date, by assigning the water applications. Plaintiff contends there is no 'vater available under the g-round purchased from 1\'IcGarry but available under the state
ground and Sevy gTound which he has purchased. He
seems to contend there is no water available under the
application for use on the McGarry ground but that the
water is available under the same applications for use on
other ground.
The very actions and course of conduct of plaintiff
belies the contention that he ever believed his present
claims to be true. Why did he not rescind the contract
in March, 1946, when the state .engineer advised him the
applications would not be approved 1 Why did he request
permission to put down the two wells 1. Why did Thompson apply for and procure a homestead entry, anrl why
did plaintiff purchase state land and other land, and then
apply for a change of place and use and point of diversion and subsequently drill wells on such other land 1
Why did plaintiff make a proposition to defendant to
modify the contract and purchase only 320 acres' Why
did he write the state engineer, through his counsel, that
he had decided to let the land go back and forfeit his contract, but first he wanted to move the wells from the
ground? Why did he write the state engineer on May
23rd;1946, as follows: "I would like to write you in reference to the two wells you have allowed me to drill. Insofar as transferring location from some ground I am
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under contract to. McGarry for, ·to some ground I am
buying from Heber Sevy of Cedar would this distance of
change of location be permissible.
hibit me from doing this.

Could McGarry pro-

I am now hauling pipe and

well pumps * * * ~ '' Why did he write the state engineer
on July 19th, 1946, ''enclosed is letter from Is om. It is
also the reason I need some good advice whether to try
to purchase some of the land from McGarry or to forget
it entirely and try and put the two wells you are allowing
me on some other ground I can purchase from l\1r. Sevy~''
Why did plaintiff make demand on ·McGarry as late as
the ·summer or fall of 1946 to produce an abstract of title,
with the idea, so he said, that if the title was all right he
could always change the wells back to the McGarry tract'
Are these things consistent with the belief that there \Yas
no water available~ And do they not show an utterly inconsistent' and vaccilating policy~
It is extremely doubtful whether the statements made
by defendant concerning availability of water, under all
the circumstances in this case, can be classed as anything
excepting mere expressions of opinion, or trader's talk,
and therefore not actionable. The general principle of
law that a mere expression of opinion, however erroneous,
will not warrant cancellation of a contract, is so well established that citation of authority is unnecessary. Ho\Vever, it is not necessary to invoke this doctrine because
we fail to find any statements or representations made by
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defendant that are untrue. rrhe testimony is to the effect
that whenever and where in the Beryl district wells were
drilled, long after 1946, water was found available. Frailey does not contend otherwise. He drilled wells himself
and found water available. We reiterate-that alleged
fraud invol,~ed in claimed fraudul~nt representations
must, to be actionable, relate to facts then existing or
which have previously existed. See Nielson case, supra.
This case also holds, citing ample authority therein, that
a statement .as to a future act or as to the future conduct
of a person would be in the nature of a mere opinion and
therefore not actionable. See also Ackerman vs. Bramwell Inv. Co., 12 Pac. (2nd) 623, 80 Utah 52.
An actionable representation must relate to
past ·or existing facts and cannot consist of unfulfilled predications, or erroneous conjectures as to
future events. 26 C. J. page 1087, Sec. 25, citing
many cases from all jurisdictions. Also, 37 C. J. 8.
page 231, Sec. 11.
As heretofore pointed out, the only testimony in the
record concerning the claimed misrepresentations, is the
evidence of. the plaintiff which was controverted by the
defendant. It does not meet the legal requirement that
fraud must be proved by evidence that .is clear and convincing.
To support a rescission of the contract or cancellation of the mortgage, the evidence should be
clear and convincing in character, and the preponderance of evidence support him who claims the
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right to rescind. The rule is stated in Ferrell vs.
WisuJell, 45 Utah 202, 143 Pac. 582-3 as follows:
We have no right to overlook the whol~some rule
that where deeds or contracts are sought to be vacated and set aside upon the ground of fraud and
deceit, the burden of proving the alleged fraud is
upon him who asserts it; moreover, that the fraua
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Taylor vs. Moore, 51 Pac. (2nd) 222, 87 Utah
493.
See also:
Greco vs. Graco, 39 Pac. (2nd) 318, 85 Utah 241.
Lane vs. Peterson, 251 Pac. 37 4, 68 Utah 585.
Nielson vs. Lea1nington, etc., 4f? Pac. (2nd) 439,
at pages 441-2, 87 Utah 69.

By defendant's cross-complaint he seeks the judgment of this court that the contract be declared and determined to have been abandoned by plaintiff. It is alleged
that plaintiff ha~ not paid the taxes on the premises, and
that he failed to crop and till the acreage contemplated
by the applications for appropriation of 'vater for which
drilling permits have been issued, and has failed to make
any paYIDrents due unde! the terms of the contract. By
his reply the plaintiff admits he did not pay the taxes
and admits he has not tilled or cropped any acreage or
paid any money in excess of the down payment, but alleges he is not obligated to drill any wells on the land described in the contract or to harvest any crops. (R. 40).
Clearly the defendant was entitled to the holding of the
trial court that the contract has been abandoned by plain-
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tiff and should be determined to be forfeited. In fact,
plaintiff testified that he had no intention of proceeding
further with the contract.

Defendant submits that there has been no fraudulent misrepresentations and no actionable misrepresentations; that the plaintiff has failed in the burden of proof;
that by his actions and conduct he has affirmed the contract even though it be found there were fraudulent misrepresentations; that plaintiff cannot retain some of the
benefits under the contract and then repudiate the contract; that any right of rescission, if there ever was such
a right, has been lost and waived through failure to act
timely and that plaintiff cannot prevail in this cause on
any theory whatsoever. Defendant submits, moreover,
that to permit the plaintiff to regain the money paid some_
two years ago, and repudiate the cqntract so that he
might evade the provisions thereof and retain all of the
water applications and filings, would be inequitable and
permit plaintiff to enrich himself at the expense of defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINE, WILSON AND CLINE,

.4ttorneys for Respondent:
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